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Abstract 
 The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price 
auctions.  The purpose is to create (possibly extreme) conditions under which tacit 
collusion develops quickly, naturally and reliably; study models of its development, and 
then study institutional and environmental remedies that would cause it to evolve into 
competitive behavior.  Special environments were implemented with a purpose of 
creating good conditions for the development of tacit collusion.  The special 
environments were based on a type of public, symmetrically “folded” preferences 
together with what we call “item-aligned” preferences.  Once tacit collusion developed, 
remedies were implemented and the success of the remedies in promoting competitive 
behavior was studied. 
 The results are as follow.  (1) The environmental conditions do foster tacit 
collusion. (2) The tacit collusion corresponds to the unique buyer Pareto Equilibrium of a 
game theoretic model of the auction process. (3) Once tacit collusion developed, it 
proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of 
the game theoretic model. (4) The only remedy that was clearly successful was a non-
public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, “folded” 
and “item aligned” patterns of preferences, creating head to head competition between 
two agents reminiscent of the concept of a “maverick”. 
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Jin Li          Charles R. Plott 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The research reported here explores both the conditions under which tacit collusion 
develops and the remedies that might be taken to transform tacit collusion into a 
competitive solution.  The issue is approached from the point of view of three broad 
questions.  Can we observe behavior in auctions that might be interpreted as successful 
tacit collusion (in the absence of conspiracy)?  Can the behavior be understood in terms 
of game theoretic models?  If so, can the behavior be understood in terms of equilibrium 
selection? The institutional setting is an auction in which game theoretic models have a 
natural interpretation and multiple equilibria exist in those models. In the context of the 
game theoretic models, the question is focused on the several equilibria of non-repeated 
game models and the conditions under which some equilibria are favored by the data and 
others are not.  Specifically, one equilibrium is favorable to the buyers (labeled “tacit 
collusion”) and another is favorable to the seller (labeled “competitive”).  If the system 
has a tendency to go to one, under what conditions can the system be made to naturally 
gravitate to the other and what role can theory play in identifying the conditions?  
 Collusion among several (five or more) agents has never been observed in an 
experimental market environment in the absence of conspiracy and/or special facilitating 
devices. Consequently, few experimental studies have addressed the issue of how to stop 
tacit collusion once it has started.  This paper addresses the issue in two steps.  First, we 
identify an experimental environment in which tacit collusive-type behavior evolves 
naturally and quickly and does so without the aid of verbal communication and without  
 
• The support of the National Science Foundation, and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics is 
gratefully acknowledged.  Comments from Katerina Sherstyuk, Joseph Cook, and participants in the Caltech 
seminar on laboratory methods in economics and political science were very helpful.  
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the aid of side payments.  Secondly, we explore the use and effectiveness of vehicles that 
hold a potential for disrupting or terminating collusion.  Because of the complexity of the 
issues, the large set of potential collusion “remedies”, and necessarily sparse data, we use 
an exploratory methodology.  Institutional changes are implemented in sequences that 
depend upon what has been observed.  The exploratory approach is frequently used under 
such circumstances.    
Two different experimental environments were developed and explored.  One 
environment is labeled "collusion conducive".  It was designed with the purpose of 
creating an environment in which tacit collusion would evolve.  The second environment, 
labeled "competitive conducive", involves changes in the first environment, implemented 
for the purpose of studying the stability of (tacit) collusive behavior.  For convenience, 
from time to time we may refer to these two environments as the “collusive” environment 
and the “competitive” environment even though the latter will take various forms as we 
study how collusion can be extinguished. 
Both the collusive and competitive environments have common structural 
elements and some common institutional elements.  The common environment has 
“repeated game” features in that agents participated in a series of auctions.  Except as 
otherwise noted, the number of items equaled the number of participants.  Preferences of 
agents were additive, in the sense that no synergies existed.  Each item had a value 
independent of other items acquired and no two items had the same value for an 
individual.  Except under the case of special treatments that will be discussed later, the 
preferences over the items had two important symmetries that we thought would be 
supportive of (tacit) collusive behavior.   
The first property of preferences we will call “strong ordinal symmetry” – if agent 
i had the mth highest value for item X and agent j had the nth highest value item X then 
agent i had the nth highest value on the item for which individual j had the mth highest 
value. As will be discussed, this pattern of symmetry has a type of “folded” property in 
that it has the potential for simultaneously placing any two individuals in two, exactly 
opposite conflicts.  This pattern of relationships holds the possibility that competition can 
“unfold” into tacit collusion as pairs are able to find a mutually beneficial equilibrium.  If 
i and j do not compete then both face a “next in line” with a similar conflict.  The 
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sequential resolution of these conflicts can theoretically result in an “unfolding” from one 
equilibrium to a completely different one.     
The second feature of preferences we will call “item-aligned” preferences.  For 
any item that an individual preferred the most, that individual also had the highest value 
among all agents.  That is, each had his or her “own item” in the sense that it was clear 
that in any bidding contest an individual would always “win” the item that the individual 
preferred the most.  In that sense, we can label an item as “individual i’s item” as if it is 
clear who would get it.  Thus, except in the special cases discussed later each agent had 
the highest value among all agents for one item and that was the item that was most 
valuable to the individual agent. 
The issue is how the institutions might interact with these basic structural features 
to determine equilibrium.  Institutional issues aside, how the two structural features might 
work together suggests why they might be supportive of collusion.  Suppose agent i’s 
item is A.  If j has the second highest value then i has the second highest value on B.  If 
they compete then i will pay j’s value for A and j will pay i’s value for B.  If they do not 
compete then they are faced by competition from agents whose values are third from the 
top, and if competition can be removed at that level through the same mechanism then 
competition is encountered at still a lower level.  This “unfolding” of competition is what 
the environment was designed to facilitate.  The issue is how the unfolding might be 
facilitated by institutions and more importantly, what institutions might “reverse” the 
process if a (tacit) collusive equilibrium evolved.  Thus, partial success would be the 
creation of an environment in which collusion would naturally evolve. 
The basic institutional framework studied is the simultaneous, continuous, 
ascending price auction.  The collusive conducive environment operated under conditions 
of full information.  All preferences, payoffs, and bids and the identification numbers of 
bidders were public information.  By contrast, the competitive conducive environment 
operated with less public information and with slightly different rules that operated 
within the auction.   
The primary objective was to learn if the collusive conducive environment could 
facilitate the (tacit) collusive equilibrium for without it, the second issue could not be 
addressed.  As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, the creation of the tacit collusive 
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outcome was definitely not a foregone conclusion because collusion with a large number 
of agents had never before been observed.  Early experiments had demonstrated that 
symmetry is an important feature in moving solutions away from simple competitive 
outcomes toward more cooperative ones (Plott, 1982) and more recent research by 
Sherstyuk and her co-authors successfully produced tacit collusion in auctions with no 
more than three bidders, but more complex environments prices almost always converge 
to near the competitive equilibrium.3
The first basic results are that within the collusive conductive environment the 
system equilibrated quickly to the (tacit) collusive equilibrium.  Several measures and 
characteristics of this process are chronicled in the results section of the paper.  The 
process does not seem to have the sequential property as suggested by the unfolding 
property but instead is discontinuous, with an almost “jump” toward the equilibrium.  
Thus, the first part of the study was very successful.  Collusive equilibria emerged and 
did so reliably under collusive conducive conditions. 
The second result is that collusive equilibria, once established, are stable in the 
sense that removal of central properties of the collusive conducive environment did not 
force the auction away from the collusive equilibrium.  Public information about 
preferences and about bidder identification did not change the equilibrium.  Several 
changes in auction rules had no effect. Disruptions of the strong, ordinal symmetry by 
removing some of the items did not disrupt the equilibrium.  Only when a “maverick” 
preference was introduced under conditions of lack of public information about 
preferences, the collusive equilibrium was quickly disrupted and the system evolved to 
the competitive solution.  The “maverick” was an agent who had the same most preferred 
item as one of the other agents. 
The paper is outlined as follows.  In Section 2, the background experimental work 
is discussed.  Our experiments build on that literature.  Section 3 contains the details of 
the experimental environments.  The details of the preferences and institutions are found 
there.  Section 4 is the experimental design that explains the number of experiments and 
the conditions that were in place for each experiment.  Section 5 discusses models and 
                                                 
3 The posted price effect discovered by Plott and Smith (2004) shows that a “sealed-bid” like institution can 
have the effect to improve the payoff of the side of the market tendering the bid. 
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theory.  The correspondence between the game theoretic solutions and the experimental 
procedures in the auctions are discussed in detail.  Section 6 contains the results, which 
are divided into two sections.  The first section of the results explains the nature of the 
collusive equilibrium and how it is reached.  The second section of the results explains 
the changes in the environment that we implemented as attempts to make the collusive 
equilibrium switch itself to the competitive equilibrium.  Section 7 is a summary of 
conclusions. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
There are very few empirical examples of collusion in auctions in the absence of 
conspiracy or without the aid of facilitating devices.  Hendricks and Porters (1988) 
studied the bidding of drainage leases on the Outer Continental Shelf.  Their findings 
suggest that there were coordination in bids among firms that own tracts adjacent to the 
lease for sale. Cramton and Schwarz (2000) reported what appear to be attempts to 
collude in FCC spectrum auction but have no evidence of actual, price influencing 
collusion.  In particular, they pointed out how bidders used the last several digits of the 
bids to signal their intent. 
 Of course, since bidder values are typically unknown in the field, collusion is hard 
to document.  This difficulty can be easily overcome by laboratory experiments, since 
values of the bidders can be designed by the experimenters.  Isaac and Plott (1981) were 
the first to study conspiracy experimentally.  Isaac and Walker (1985) allowed explicit 
communications among bidders in auctions, and they observed conspiracies in seven out 
of twelve auction series.  Tacit collusion in auctions with standard procedure, however, 
was rarely observed in earlier experimental studies.  Even when it was observed, tacit 
collusion was unstable and the prices easily converged back to competitive levels. (See 
Burns (1985) and Clauser and Plott (1993)).  In a related industrial organization context, 
Isaac and Smith (1985) searched for predatory behavior in constraint of competition and 
failed to find any.  Kagel (1995) offered a survey on earlier experiments on collusions in 
auctions.  
A sequence of recent experiments successfully observed robust tacit collusion in 
special auction institutions. Sherstyuk (1999) studied ascending auctions under common 
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values. In her experiments, there were in each auction two units of items and three 
bidders, who demanded one unit of item only. She introduced in the auction a particular 
bid improvement rule: bidders are allowed to submit a bid that equals the highest 
outstanding bid. If there are multiple highest bidders on the items, a lottery will be run to 
decide the winner. With this bid improvement rule, Sherstyuk reported persistent and 
stable tacit collusions: bidders match each other’s low bids in most of the auctions. 
Sherstyuk (2001) obtained similar results under private values.  
 Robust tacit collusion in auctions with “standard institutions and procedures” was 
first observed by Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2003). In their environment, there were two 
items for sale in an ascending auction with either two or five bidders, who demand both 
items. The experimental environment conformed to the theoretical conditions of Brusco 
and Lopomo’s (2002), and the auction results mirrored patterns suggested by theory. 
When there were two bidders only, they often tacitly colluded through splitting the two 
items. No collusion was found in auctions with five bidders. Kwasnica and Sherstyuk 
(2003) also examined the role of complementarity in collusions. They found that 
complementarity between items reduced collusion. However, with moderate level of 
complementarity, collusion still occurred with bidders taking turns to win the auction. A 
survey of recent results on collusion in auction can be found in Sherstyuk (forthcoming). 
 
3. COLLUSION-CONDUCTIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
 Each experiment started with a collusion-conductive environment. In this 
environment, each auction consists of eight subjects and eight items. The basic market 
architecture has all items offered in simultaneously functioning, continuous, ascending 
first-price auctions.  Within that basic structure, the experimental environments have 
three major parts.  The central feature, the “folded” and “item-aligned” properties of 
valuations pattern will be discussed below in the subsection (3.1) of Items and 
Preferences. The details of the auction architecture will be in the institution environment 
subsection, (3.2). The information structure is discussed in a separate subsection, (3.3). 
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Once perfect tacit collusion4 emerged and had persisted, the experimental 
environment then transitioned into a competition-conductive environment through 
various treatments. These treatments were exploratory in nature and occasionally differed 
in experiments. We document these treatments in details in the experimental procedure 
and design section.  
 
3.1 Items and Preferences:  
In every experiment, there were eight subjects. Each of them was given an ID 
number from 101-108 anonymously. In the collusion-conductive environments, there 
were eight items for sale, which were numbered from one to eight. The subjects’ 
valuations for the items ranged from 50-900 francs, where one franc can be exchanged 
after the experiment for1 cent. There were no complementarities between items, so a 
subject’s valuation of a group of items was the sum of his valuations of each item in the 
group. These valuations were identical across experiments to facilitate comparisons. 
Within an experiment, the valuations differed round by round and was designed to 
facilitate tacit collusion in earlier rounds. In the first six rounds, on each item, there were 
two subjects whose valuations were significantly higher than the rest. This is illustrated in 
Figure I below, which is the actual valuation sheet we used in round 1 of all the 
experiments.  
On item 1 and 3 in Figure I, subject 101 and 102 had valuations higher than 700 
francs, while the rest had valuations below 350. Similar pattern holds for 103 and 104 on 
item 5 and 7, 105 and 106 on item 2 and 6, and 107 and 108 on item 4 and 8.  These 
valuations suggest that if 101 and 102 could “split” item 1 and 3, then each could win one 
of items at a low price, and similarly for others.   
The symmetry of valuations runs deep into the preference. For convenience, we 
call a subject n-th on an item if he has the n-th highest valuations on the item.5  We 
design the valuations such that, if subject i is m-th and subject j is n-th highest on an item, 
then j is m-th on the item where i is n-th. In Figure 1, 101 is 7th and 105 is 3rd on item 4. 
Then on item 7, on which 105 is 7th, 101 is 3rd. For the purpose of collusion, it is enough 
                                                 
4 We define an auction outcome as perfect tacit collusion if all items are sold at their reservation price 
efficiently. 
5 There are no ties in valuations.  
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to note that for any subject i and j, if j is n-th on an item i is 1st, then i is n-th on the item 
where j is 1st. 
The general ordinal structure of folded preference remained throughout the 
collusion-conductive experiment, but the valuations of subjects changed from round to 
round. Consequently, the pairs of subjects who shared higher valuations on the same 
items in one round were typically not “paired together” in the next round.  In Figure I 
which corresponds to the real round 1, subject 101 was paired with 102 and had high 
valuations in item 1 and 3.  In round 2, 101 had high valuations on item 3 and 7, and 102 
had high valuations on item 1 and 8. (Detailed valuations of subjects in round 2 is not 
reported here.)   
Other than strong ordinal symmetry, another crucial feature in the design of 
preference is “item-alignedness.” This says that for any bidder, the item on which he has 
the highest valuation among the bidders also happens to be the one he values most. The 
general property of “item-aligned” feature is also clear from Figure I: subject 103 had the 
highest valuations among all subjects for item 7.  Consequently, 103 by design valued 
item 7 most among all items.  This “item-aligned” feature suggests that 103 would be a 
natural winner of item 7.  Therefore, we denote item 7 as “103’s item.” More generally, 
we denote the item on which subject i has the highest valuation as subject i’s item.  
[Figure I] 
 The total payoff of any subject in the experiments is calculated by summing his 
payoffs from all the items he won. In particular, a subject’s payoff on each of his winning 
item is the difference between his valuation of the item and the price he pays. If a 
subject’s winning price exceeds his valuation, then the subject incurs a loss on the item 
he wins. A subject’s payoff in a given round is the sum of the payoffs of each item he 
wins. A subject’s total payoff in the experiment is the sum of his payoffs in all rounds, 
excluding a practice round, which will be discussed later.  
 
3.2 Institutional Environment: 
 The basic institutional environment is a computerized simultaneous ascending 
auction (SAA). SAA is an auction in which all the items are open for sale simultaneously 
using an English-Auction like format until some ending criteria is reached. Subjects place 
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their bids through computers.  Each bid specifies an item to be bid on and the associated 
bid price, while satisfying two restrictions. First, the smallest bid that can be entered is 
100 francs, the reservation price of all items. Second, the minimal bid increment is 10 
francs. This means that a new bid on an item is required to be at least 10 francs higher 
than its current highest bid.  For example, if the current highest bid for an item is 680, 
then the lowest possible new bid on it is 680+10=690. The auction ends only when no 
new bid is entered for any item for a consecutive 30 seconds. That is, all auctions are 
open until they all close. The highest bidder of an item wins it and pays his bidding price. 
It is possible for a subject to win multiple items. 
 
3.3 Information Structure: 
In the collusion conductive stage of the environment, the subjects have almost 
complete information of the auctions: they know the valuation of all subjects through a 
valuation sheet passed out by the experimenter at the beginning of each auction; they can 
also observe from the computer screen who (given by the ID number) had bid what price 
on which item. The only information missing is that ID numbers are assigned 
anonymously, so the subjects do not know the IDs of other subjects. Furthermore, the 
subjects do not know the total number of rounds, except in two experiments where the 
experimenters announced immediately before the final round that it was the final round. 
When the experiment transitioned into the competition-conductive phase, various 
treatments were applied to reduce information. We discuss the details in next section. 
 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL PRODCEDURES AND DESIGN 
4.1 Experimental Procedures: 
 The subjects in the experiments were mostly Caltech undergraduates, with a few 
graduate students in non-economics departments in some experiments. All the 
experiments lasted between one and a half to two and a half hours and took place in the 
Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science. Upon entry into the 
experimental laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned an ID number and a seat. They 
also received an instruction sheet, a sample valuation sheet, and were asked to read them 
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carefully. Several minutes after all subjects had arrived, the experimenter read the 
instruction sheet out loud in the laboratory. To make sure all subjects understood the 
rules, the experimenter then invited the subjects to raise their hands and ask questions 
about the experiment.  The experimenter answered the questions in public until no more 
questions were asked. All subjects then went through a practice round, which was 
identical to a real round except its outcome is not counted in the total payoffs. Subjects 
were again encouraged to ask questions after the practice round, and the experimenter 
answered them in public. The first real round started only when no further questions were 
asked.  
In the first several rounds of the experiments until perfect tacit collusion had 
emerged and persisted, i.e. in the collusion-conductive stage of the experiment, all 
subjects received a valuation sheet from the experimenter at the beginning of each round. 
The sheet contained information about the valuation of all subjects on every item in that 
round. The subjects were asked to read the valuation sheet carefully and raised their 
hands once they were ready. The experimenter waited for all of the subjects to raise their 
hands before starting the auction. The auction was conducted in the format described in 
section 3.2. Once the auction ended, the subjects were asked to record their earnings on 
the sheet at the end of their instruction sheet. The experimenter typically waited for one 
to two minutes for the subjects to record their earnings before starting another round by 
passing out new valuation sheets. Once the experiment transitioned to the competition-
conductive phase, the experimenters stopped passing out valuation sheets under 
conditions to be discussed later, and the subjects obtained their own valuation through 
computer screen. In some experiments, the experiment also announced before the final 
round that it was the final round.  Once all auctions are finished, subjects received their 
payoffs from the experimenter. This concluded the experiment. 
 
4.2. Experimental Design 
 A total of six experiments were conducted.  With the exception of institutional 
and informational changes that will be described below, all experiments were conducted 
in the same way. In addition, three pilot experiments were conducted as part of the 
process of developing procedures and debugging instructions and software.  
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 The design calls for all experiments to begin within the collusion-conducive 
environment. The collusion-conductive stage of the experiment starts from Round 1 and 
lasts until the subjects reached two consecutive rounds of perfect collusion. The 
experiment then transitioned to the competition-conductive stage. In this environment, 
the experimenter started to remove information and applied various treatments 
sequentially to assess the effectiveness of a procedure to break the collusion. Of course, 
this design was unknown to the subjects. The number of rounds in an experiment 
depended on the bidding behavior of subjects. 
The treatments were motivated by the six experimental design features, which 
were particularly conductive to tacit collusion. We discuss these features in the Model 
Section. For each of the feature, we design one treatment to eliminate it. These treatments 
include (i) removing public displays of the subject’s ID associated with the bids; (ii) 
removing public information of valuations by not passing out the valuation sheet; (iii) 
changing the ending rule of the auction to fixed duration, (iv) removing several items for 
sale so some agents would necessarily win nothing; (v) destroying expectations of 
subjects by unexpectedly changing the structure of the preferences to eliminate the 
folding and item-alignedness properties; and finally (vi) announcing the final round. 
These treatments were applied in roughly the same order as above in most 
experiments, where occasional differences in orders came from the exploratory nature of 
the treatments. We followed the general rule that a new treatment was implemented if the 
previous treatment failed to sustain a competitive outcome, and tacit collusion returned.  
When applying the new treatment, we retained all the previous treatments. In this way, 
we examined the combined effects of the treatments. Since the speed to reach perfect 
tacit collusion after each treatment varied in different experiments, the number of rounds 
in each experiment differed significantly. Table I below documents the details of these 
treatments. 
[Table 1] 
 Four of the experimental treatments are straightforward, including blanking the 
ID, taking away valuation sheets, changing the ending rule to fixed duration, and 
announcing the final rounds. Removing the items for sale and destroying expectations are 
more complicated.  While removing the items for sale, we used the same structure of 
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valuations and then took away several columns, which corresponded to the removed 
items. While destroying expectations, we typically switched the valuations of two items 
for some subjects in order to have multiple subjects with valuations above 800 on some 
items. In this way, all subjects with valuations above 800 on an item might want to bid 
for it, and this could lead to a bidding war. Details on how items were removed and how 
valuations of items were switched are documented in detail in Section 6.2, and can be 
found in Table X and Table XI.  
 
 
5. MODELS  
As is well known, game theory lacks precision when the environment applied has 
multiple Nash Equilibria (N.E.). In some situations, the prediction can be so broad that 
almost any pattern of outcomes can be described as a N.E.  The challenge, of course, is to 
supplement the theory with additional principles to yield more precise predictions. 
Auction theory is a good example in this regard.  Since Robinson (1985), many papers 
have demonstrated the theoretical existence of low price N.E. Recently, Brusco and 
Lopomo (2002) showed that as long as there are not too many more bidders than the 
number of objects sold, there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium resulting in low prices 
even under incomplete information.  
While our environment has complete information, similar reasoning from Brusco 
and Lopomo can be applied, and it can be shown that every price between the reservation 
price and the second-highest valuations can be supported as a Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium(SPE). In terms of predicting outcomes, there are two equilibria that deserve 
special attention. 
The first equilibrium corresponds to competitive bidding. The behaviors of the 
subjects that reach this equilibrium can be characterized by two principles. The first is the 
principle of surplus maximization, which says that when choosing a bid, individual 
bidders will place their bids on the item that maximizes their surplus given the current 
prices in the auction. The second is a minimum bid principle that says that the individuals 
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choose the minimal possible price allowed by the system when choosing an amount to 
bid.6   
In the environments studied here, it can be seen that if everyone else is following 
the strategy implied by the two principles, the best response of an individual is to follow 
the same strategy as well. Consequently, these strategy forms a S.P.E. and the prices of 
all items will ascend to the second-highest valuations, at which price the individual with 
the second highest value stops bidding. 
 The second equilibrium is called perfect tacit collusion.  If we treat all buyers as a 
group, perfect tacit collusion occurs when the buyers maximize their own total surplus, 
defined as the sum of profits across all buyers. In a perfect tacit collusion, each item goes 
to the bidder with the highest valuation while the prices of all items equal the minimum 
prices set by the auction (the auction reservation price). To describe intermediate levels 
of tacit collusion, we define ( ) MaximumSurplus TotalProfitc TotalProfit
MaximumSurplus CompetitiveProfit
−= −  as a 
measure of the competitiveness of the market.  In this definition, Maximum Surplus is the 
largest possible sum of profits of the buyers, which is obtained only if all items are sold 
to the buyer of the highest valuations at the reservation price.  Competitive Profit is the 
sum of the profits obtained by the buyers when each item is sold to the highest-valued 
buyer at the price of the second-highest valuation.  A higher c reflects a greater 
competitiveness of the market.  In particular, c=1 indicates the market is perfectly 
competitive and  c=0 corresponds to perfect tacit collusion. 
 An alternative definition of tacit collusion applies to bidding behavior as opposed 
to the prices and allocations. Under this definition, a subject is classified as a tacit 
colluder if he only bids on items that satisfied one of the following three criteria: 
1) the item is the subject’s own item. 
 2) the item remains at the reservation price for more than 60 seconds.7
3) the item “belongs” to a bidder who has previously bid on the subject’s item. 
                                                 
6 These two principles were first described and tested in Brewer and Plott (1996) and later were combined 
and termed “straightforward bidding” by Milgrom (2000).  The principles were tested again in Plott and 
Salmon (2004). 
7 The “at least one bid in the 60 seconds” is to require that the subjects are not “negligent”. We pick 60 
seconds arbitrarily: any change from 30 to 100 seconds will not make any difference in our definition of 
tacit colluders. 
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Otherwise, the subject is considered a non-colluder. We say “an item belongs to a 
subject” if the subject has the highest valuation on the item.  
 Although this definition does not contain the full complexities of bidding 
strategies, which will be discussed further in the Results Section, it does capture the key 
characteristics of the collusive behaviors. The definition reflects the idea that a tacit 
collusive bidder is one who mostly bids only on his own item. The tacit colluder bids on 
other subject’s item if and only if either 1) the item has not been bid at all for a long time, 
or 2) the item belongs to a non-collusive subject who has bid on his item.  In the first 
case, the tacit colluder tries to exploit the possible negligence of some bidder. In the 
second case, some subjects bid on the tacit colluder’s item. The tacit colluder punishes 
the other subject and perhaps tries to push the subject away from competitive bidding. 
Using this definition, we obtain perfect tacit collusion if every subject is a tacit colluder. 
Other than perfect collusion and the competitive equilibrium, there is also a 
continuum of equilibrium in between. In fact, any efficient allocation with a price vector 
between the reservation price and the second-highest valuations can be supported as a 
SPE. To see this, we construct an easy strategy as follows. In the first bid, we require 
each subject to bid on “his own” item of the final equilibrium price. If any subject 
deviates, all the subjects then revert to the strategy given by the Principle of Surplus 
Maximization and Minimum Bid Principle. The strategy constructed above can be 
checked as a SPE. In other words, all intermediate equilibrium can be thought of as a 
combination of the competitive strategy and the collusive strategy. 
The discussions above suggest that if we simply look for N.E. or even S.P.E. in 
our collusion-conductive environment, little can be said about the final outcome. Without 
further equilibrium refinement, any price vector between the reservation price and the 
second highest-valuations of the items is a possible outcome consistent with a S.P.E. 
However, since the collusive and competitive equilibria corresponds to clear bidding 
behaviors and the rest equilibria are combinations of the two, it is natural to conjecture 
that the bidding outcome is likely to converge to one of the these two polar equilibria.  
One might think the competitive equilibrium is the natural outcome because the collusive 
equilibrium requires a huge amount of coordination among subjects. The competitive 
equilibrium can be supported by natural and simple bidding strategies, and it has been 
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observed in various experimental studies on auctions.  However, the profits of the 
subjects under the competitive equilibrium are very low compared to that under perfect 
tacit collusion.  Moreover, the difficulties to obtain a collusive equilibrium, which 
requires a grand collusion among all subjects, are reduced in our environment. Our 
symmetrical and “item aligned” feature of the preferences helps reduce a grand collusion 
with many subjects into a sequence of smaller collusions with two subjects.  
 In summary, there are six key features of the collusion-conductive environment of 
this auction that support the tacit collusion model as an equilibrium.  We focus on these 
because their removal or perturbation could eliminate important support for the collusive 
equilibrium and thus lead to the identification of tools for the shaping and enforcing of 
the competitive outcome.  The first two features relates to the information structure of the 
auction. (1) There is common knowledge of valuations for all items: before each auction, 
a valuation sheet with every subject’s valuations is passed to all subjects. This facilitates 
perfect tacit collusion by helping the subjects coordinate on the allocation of the items. 
(2) The bidding behavior of subjects can be identified: all subjects know the ID number 
associated with each bid. In other words, they know who has entered which bid. This 
makes perfect tacit collusion easier to implement because it makes easy the necessary 
punishments to enforce the collusive equilibrium. For example, if subject i enters a bid on 
subject j’s item, j knows for sure i has made the bid and won’t be mistaken at his target of 
punishment. Increasing the punishment power of j helps discourage i from bidding on j’s 
item.  
(3) Every bid can be followed by a reaction of other bidders: The ending rule in 
this experiment states that the auction ends if and only if no new bids are entered for a 
consecutive 30 seconds. This gives a quasi-repeated structure to each single round of the 
auctions in the sense that it can be viewed as a game with possibly infinitely many stages. 
Each stage ends if a) someone enters a bid or b) no subject enters the bid for a 
consecutive 30 seconds. If b) occurs, the game ends. In contrast to auctions with fixed 
ending times, this rule deters “last second deviation” and in turn prevents competitive 
bidding in fear of “last second deviation.” Related discussions on ending rules are in, for 
example, Ockenfels and Roth (forthcoming). 
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 (4) The environment is characterized by strong ordinal symmetry. Symmetry of 
the valuations is known to increase the likelihood of collusive outcomes. Exactly why 
this occurs is still unknown.  It could be related to the ease with which a subject can 
identify and understand the behavior of others. Alternatively, it could be related to a focal 
point argument. The fact that each item has a distinct highest valued subject makes focal 
the tacit collusive equilibrium in which every subject bids reservation price on the item 
he has the highest valuation. Moreover, the symmetry implies in this tacit equilibrium the 
division of profits for the buyers is natural: each subject wins his own item.  Without this 
property, a tacit collusion can be sustained only through some “repeated game” 
arguments: bidders who don’t win any item in one hundred have to be compensated in 
the future. The symmetry allows for tacit collusion an equilibrium without invoking 
complicated repeated game strategies. 
 (5) The valuations of the bidders satisfy the item aligned property. In other words, 
the subject who has the highest valuation on an item also prefers the item most. As with 
symmetry, this greatly facilitates the division of profits among the subjects. With item 
alignedness, what is best for the group is also best for all individual subjects. In contrast, 
if we destroy this property by having several subjects prefer the same item most, there 
will be several Pareto collusive equilibria. Since each subject prefers the equilibrium that 
gives him the highest profit, this conflict in equilibrium preference might push the 
subjects to the competitive equilibrium.  
 The above observations make clear a central theoretical property of the situation.  
With item alignedness property, together with symmetry, there is a unique a Pareto 
Optimal Subgame Perfect Equilibrium from the point of view of the buyers.  The 
following proposition states the property formally. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider a simultaneous ascending auction with n bidders and 
n items. If each bidder has the highest valuation on exactly one item, which also is 
his most valued item, then the unique buyer Pareto Optimal Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium with undominated strategy is that each bidder wins his item (the item 
he has the highest valuation) at the reservation price.   
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 (6) Finally, the theory of repeated games can be applied to the experiment. The 
repeated nature of the auctions in the experiment makes the tacit collusion more likely to 
occur. As mentioned in (4), perfect tacit collusion cannot be supported as a SPE if there 
are more buyers than the items and the buyers play undominated strategy. However, if we 
allow for repeated auctions, perfect tacit collusion will be enforceable as an equilibrium 
with sufficiently high discount rates of the subjects. This brings extra instruments to 
sustain the tacit collusion outcome. One possible strategy that supports the perfect tacit 
collusion is that if any subject ever bids on another subject’s item, then all of the subjects 
revert back to competitive biddings immediately in all future rounds.  
 Together these six features in our experimental design create a presumption in 
favor of the perfect tacit collusion as opposed to other outcomes. Even if perfect tacit 
collusion happens in this setting, however, it is unclear which feature or the combinations 
of them foster the occurrence of perfect tacit collusion.  Since each of the six features can 
be associated with the institutional features above, we apply treatments designed to 
remove one of the features at a time to develop insights about how it interacted with other 
features to promote the collusive or the competitive outcome.  
 
 
6. RESULTS 
The results are divided into two sections.  The first section summarizes the patterns of 
behavior during the collusion development process.  The second section focuses on 
treatments that examine the robustness of collusion and the institutional perturbations that 
hold a potential for mitigating or stopping collusion once it has evolved. 
6.1  Collusion and Features of the Collusion Formation Process 
 
Result 1: In these environments perfect tacit collusion is reached. 
Support: We use the competitiveness of the market to measure the degree of tacit 
collusion. Recall that ( ) MaximumSurplus TotalProfitc TotalProfit
MaximumSurplus CompetitiveProfit
−= −  is a 
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normalized measure such that when items are sold on average at a price that equals the 
second highest valuation and the auction market is perfectly competitive, we have c=1. 
When c=0, every item is sold to the highest-valued bidder at its reservation price. In this 
case, we say perfect tacit collusion is reached. Figure II below shows the evolution of c in 
all six experiments.  
[Figure II] 
Perfect collusions were reached in all six experiments.  Furthermore, the speed 
they were reached is remarkable. By round 4, the competitiveness has fallen below 0.1 in 
all but two experiments.  By round 7, all six experiments have reached perfect tacit 
collusion.  It is also worthwhile to note that once subjects have perfectly tacitly colluded, 
they continued to do so before any treatments were applied to the experimental 
environment.   
 
Result 2: Tacit collusion develops over time and is indicated by (i) falling average 
prices, (ii) decreasing number of bids, and (iii) decreasing duration of the auction. 
Support:  The support for the result is divided into three separate sections. Each addresses 
a separate feature of the process. 
(i). Prices fall. 
[Figure III] 
All six experiments displayed solid decreases in prices and convergence toward 
perfect tacit collusion.  The average prices in all but four rounds were lower than the 
previous round. To get a sense of how fast the prices decrease on average, we ran a 
regression of average prices on their round numbers. The results are reported in Table II. 
The average price in the first round was 534.14, and it dropped on average per round by 
71.33. We also ran log price on the number of rounds and find that the average prices 
decreased in each round by 28%. Although the coefficients are highly significant despite 
the small sample size, they are simply descriptive statistics and have no structural 
interpretation contents. In fact, that pattern of decrease in the average prices is far from 
linear, which is an important fact that we will discuss in Result 3. 
[Table II] 
(ii) The number of bids decreases. 
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The total number of bids in the rounds of the six experiments is plotted in Figure 
IV. Although there are a few “rebounds” in the number of bids, it is still clear that the 
number of bids falls over rounds. The rate of decrease in bid number can be found in 
Table II above. On average, the number of bids dropped by 11 bids per round.  
Furthermore, the regression of log bids on rounds indicates the number of bids decreased 
by 41% per round. Just as the decrease in prices, the decrease in bids is also not linear, 
which will be discussed further in Result 3. 
[Figure IV] 
(iii) The duration of the auction decreases.  
The duration of the auctions are plotted in Figure V. Although there are 
occasional rebounds in the duration of some rounds, the downward trend toward perfect 
collusion is very clear. To get a quantitative sense about the decrease in duration, we find 
in Table II that on average the duration decreased by 54 seconds in per round. We also 
regress log duration on rounds and obtain that the duration decreases by 39% each round. 
As in prices and bids, the decline in durations is again nonlinear and will be discussed in 
Result 3. 
[Figure V] 
Results 3: The convergence toward perfect tacit collusion depends on behavior of 
the subjects in the first round. In experiments with less than two competitive 
bidders in the first round, collusion is immediate. In other experiments, subjects 
switch sequentially from competitive bidding to collusive bidding. Once a subject 
bid collusive, he rarely reverts back.   
Support: Recall that a subject is classified as a tacit colluder if he only bids on items that 
satisfy one of the following three criterions: 
1) the item “belongs” to the subject 
2) the item remains at the reservation price for more than 60 seconds. 
3) the item “belongs” to a subject who has previously bid on the subject’s item. 
Otherwise, the subject is considered a non-colluder.  
Table III below classifies the subjects as either tacit colluders or non-colluders 
according to the definition above. Every subject is denoted as 0 if he is a colluder in a 
given round and is denoted as 1 otherwise. 
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[Table III] 
From the Table, we see that in experiment 3 and 6, seven out of the eight subjects 
were tacit colluders in the first round. In these two experiments, perfect tacit collusions 
were both reached by round three. In other experiments, there were between three to five 
tacit colluders in the first round, and it took significantly longer rounds to reach perfect 
tacit collusion. In general, experiments with fewer tacit colluders in the first round also 
take longer to reach perfect collusion. The correlation between the number of tacit 
colluders in the first round and the number of rounds to reach perfect collusion is -0.80.  
The most striking feature of the table is that the evolution of bidding behavior mostly 
goes only in one direction: once a subject becomes a tacit colluder, he almost always 
remains a tacit colluder. In the 184 transitions in Table III, there are only 6 cases where 
bidders switched back to competitive bidding from collusive behavior.  Furthermore, 
most of these cases are due to the insufficiencies of our method of classifying collusive 
behavior.  
There are two leading possibilities for the failure of our classification methods. 
First, if the price of a collusive bidder’s item has been raised to a very high level through 
repeated bidding by a competitive bidder, then the collusive bidder might retaliate in the 
next round by opening the bidding on the competitive bidder’s items. By our definition, 
this bidder will then be classified as non-colluder in that round. Such situations indeed 
happened several times in our experiments.  
Second, a competitive bidder might be accidentally classified as a colluder. For 
example, when two non-collusive bidders i and j share high valuations on two items and 
if i bids on both items before j does, then B will be classified as a colluder as long as he 
only bids on these two items. This may cause a switch from tacit colluder to non-colluder 
for j. We also observed a few such cases in our experiments.  
Another dimension that the definition does not capture is the variation of bidding 
behaviors of subjects within the same group. Even if the colluders bid only on their own 
items, they do not always start bidding reservation price: some bidders start out a bid of 
500 francs on their own items. Among the non-colluders, some subjects are a lot more 
competitive than others. This variation in the intensive margin requires a more detailed 
look at the dynamics of bidding behavior, which leads us to Result 4.  
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Results 4: In experiments where collusions weren’t immediate, prices and bidding 
behaviors had a tendency for discontinuous development, similar to a regime shift, 
toward perfect collusion. 
Support: We list our results separately for bids and prices. 
I. Distribution of bids and Bid War 
It is clear from Figure IV that the number of bids did not decrease at a constant 
speed. In most rounds, the bid number decreased by less than 20 bids with an average of 
11 bids per round. However, after round 2 of Experiment 1, round 5 of Experiment 2, 
round 1 of E4, and round 1 of Experiment 5, the number of bids dropped by more than 65 
bids. These four rounds are also the ones with the most bids in the respective experiments 
(except in Experiment 2 in which round 5 is only two bids less than the round with the 
most bids). Furthermore, perfect tacit collusion emerged rapidly after these rounds. In 
this sense, the dynamics of the auctions experienced a “regime shift” in these rounds.  
Table IV below reports the average prices and number of bids at and after “the regime 
shift”. The decreases in the number of bids in these rounds are six times of the average 
decrease (11 bids per round); the decrease in average prices in these rounds is three times 
of the average (71 francs per round). 
[Table IV] 
Some detailed look at the bidding behavior right before the regime change can be 
illuminating. Take Experiment 2 as an example, there were 86 bids in round 5 and only 8 
bids in round 6. In round 5, 39 bids of the 86 came from subject 103, and another 23 bids 
from 107.  
Subject 103 had always bid competitively and entered largest number of bids in 
all previous rounds. Subject 107, however, had discovered the opportunity for collusion 
rather early: it entered only two bids in both round 3 and round 4. To understand why 107 
suddenly entered 23 bids in round 7, we look at Table V which shows the valuation of 
103 and 107 on item 1 and 3.  
[Table V] 
Table V shows that 103 and 107 share high valuations on item 1 and item 3. A 
price war can arise if 103 attempts to win both items.  We report in Table VI the 
sequence of bids made on Item 1 and Item 3 in round 5. Subject 107 started by bidding 
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the reservation price on “his item”, item 3. Soon after, however, 103 also bid on item 3. 
In response to this, 107 initially added the minimal increment onto item 3, probably 
hoping that 103 can stop bidding. The hope was unrealized and 103 continued to raise 
bids on item 3. This caused 107 to retaliate and bid on item 1, which is 103’s item. A 
bidding war broke out between 103 and 107 on item 1 and 3 and a total of 43 bids had 
been placed onto these two items. When round 6 ended, 103 won item 1 at a price of 801 
francs and 107 won item 3 with 773.  
[Table VI] 
It is worthwhile noting that 107 placed on item 1 a bid of 791, which was 20 
francs larger than his valuation. If 107 won the item at that price it would be at a loss. 
Since bidding above one’s valuation is a weakly dominated action, one might think 107 is 
irrational. In the experiment, however, this bid seems to have surprised 103 and caused 
him to think more carefully about his strategy. Indeed, only 8 bids were cast the next 
round. We believe that these “spiteful” actions are helpful in changing the behavior of 
other subjects.  A similar incidence happened in round 5 of experiment 1, in which 102 (a 
collusive bidder) suddenly raised the price by 240 on the item of 103, who has been 
bidding competitively. After the “spiteful” behavior of 102, 103 stopped bidding 
competitively in the next round.  
 
6.2. Remedies to Prevent a Collusive Equilibrium 
Once perfect collusion emerged and persisted, various treatments were applied to break 
it. These methods included: a) forced anonymous bidding, b) removed common 
knowledge of preference, c) changed ending rule of the auction, d) removal of several 
items for sale, e) changed expectations of the subjects, and f) announcement of the final 
round.  
In the first three experiments, we examined the effects of these treatments in a 
very exploratory manner. As our understanding increased, we consistently applied these 
treatments in the same order as listed in the previous paragraph in the last three 
experiments. New treatments were applied only if the previous treatment had failed to 
cause or sustain competition and the bidding returned to tacit collusion. When new 
treatments were applied, we kept all the previous treatments. In this way, we were able to 
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measure the combined effects of all the treatments. The effects of these methods on 
breaking the collusion are similar in all six experiments.  
Result 5: Forced Anonymity in bidding had no effect. 
Support: Once perfect tacit collusion persisted for two rounds, the first step we most 
often took to disrupt the collusion was to force anonymous bidding. As mentioned in 
Section 5, the intention for blanking the ID is to weaken the monitoring technology of the 
subjects by transforming the information structure from perfect information to imperfect 
public monitoring. This makes the punishment strategy less credible and deviation from 
collusive equilbrium more tempting. 
To implement anonymous bidding, we blanked the ID associated with the bids, so 
that subjects no longer knew who had entered which bids except for the bids of their own. 
Forced Anonymity had virtually no effect in breaking the tacit collusion. 
[Table VII] 
Table VII documents the various statistics of prices, bids, and durations of the 
auctions once the IDs were blanked. Average price was below 110 francs in 12 out of 15 
rounds and never exceeded 160 francs.  Occasionally, there were a few attempts that 
moved the outcome away from equilibrium. But, these attempts almost never generated a 
price above 200, and the average prices fell below 105 francs within fours rounds.  
 
Result 6: Removal of common knowledge of preferences by taking away the 
valuation sheet had little effect on breaking the tacit collusion.  
Support: Once the subjects returned to the perfect collusive equilibrium with their IDs 
blanked, the next step we most often took was to remove common knowledge of 
preferences. Lack of common knowledge forces the subjects to form their own 
expectations of the valuations of other subjects and complicates the coordination of tacit 
collusion. Since the IDs of the subjects also remain blanked, it should be enticing for the 
subjects to bid on more than one items and destroy the collusive equilibrium.  
To remove common knowledge of preferences, we stopped passing out valuation 
sheets before each round of auction. Instead, they learned about their own valuations 
from the computer screens. The removal of common knowledge of preferences had very 
small effects in breaking the collusion. 
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Table VIII documents the effects.  After the valuation sheets were removed, some 
subjects did fight over a few items in some rounds. But the fights were uncommon and in 
general of small scale. The winning prices were rarely above 200.  Moreover, bidding 
wars never lasted more than one round: the average winning prices fell below 105 francs 
in one round after the valuation sheets were first taken away. In other words, within two 
rounds after the valuation sheets were taken away, the auction converged back to the tacit 
collusive equilibrium.  
[Table VIII] 
 
It is interesting to note that in Table VIII the final winning prices were not always 
100. For example, in round 7 and 8 of experiment 6, subject 104 bid 104 instead of 100. 
This suggests that the last digit number of the bid might be used to signal the identity of 
the bidder and used to enforce the collusive equilibrium. 
 
 
Results 7: Changes in the structure of the game to eliminate the collusive 
equilibrium by switching the ending rule to fixed length had little effect in prices.  
Support: When removal of information failed to break tacit collusion, we changed the 
ending rule in one experiment. In the collusive conductive environment, an auction ends 
only if no new bids are entered for a consecutive 30 seconds. By turning the variable 
ending rule into a fixed duration rule, we changed the structure of the auction by 
transforming it from a possibly infinite horizon game to one with a finite horizon. 
Theoretically, the new ending rule encourages subjects to deviate from the collusive 
equilibrium immediately before a round ends. Anticipating this, the subjects might 
engage in competitive bidding earlier on. 
We changed the ending rule in round 11 and 12 in Experiment 2 by canceling the 
time reset option. In these two rounds, the auctions were changed to a fixed duration of 
30 seconds, so all legal bids had to be entered within 30 seconds after the auction started. 
This had little effect in breaking the collusion. 
[Table IX] 
Table IX documents the effect of fixed ending rule. The prices of the winning 
items remained low, although the allocations of the items were no longer efficient. There 
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were some deviations at the end of the auction. In round 11, subject 107 bid 120 at the 
last second on item 2, which is 102’s item. In round 12, we again saw 107 bidding on 
item 8, which was 106’s item. Subject 107’s behavior was consistent with Ockenfels and 
Roth (forthcoming), where they reported that various EBay bidders entered their bids in 
the last second. In our environment, we had eight subjects, and 107 was the only deviator 
in both rounds. After these two rounds, we restored the old ending rules in later rounds.  
We did not observe retaliations from subjects whose items were bid away by others at the 
last second.  
We restored the old ending rule mainly because there was a technical problem 
with the computer system in round 12, as one subject complained that his last-second bid 
failed to go through. As a result, there was no winner for item 5. We were concerned that 
if many subjects entered their bids in the last several seconds, many bids might not go 
through, and confusion would result thus making the experimental outcome hard to 
interpret and was not the direction we wanted to pursue. Because of this, we did not test 
the effects of fixed duration ending rule in later experiments. 
 
 
Result 8:  Destruction of short-term symmetry had some effects, but the experiment 
still converged to perfect tacit collusion in the end. 
Support: Two crucial design features that could facilitate tacit collusions are the 
symmetry and “item alignedness” properties of preference. Theoretically, symmetry and 
“item alignedness” makes the tacit collusion the unique Pareto Equilibrium, which is very 
attractive to subjects. In experimental literature, symmetry can also help facilitates the 
collusion equilibrium by making it focal. Our expectation was that the removal of these 
features would break tacit collusion.  
 To implement this, we removed several items for sale in some of the experiments.  
Experiment 3 is the first time we removed items for sale. In that experiment, we rotated 
the items to be removed. From Round 4-7, three items were removed for sale. From 
Round 8-11, five items were removed in each round.  In later experiments, we 
standardized our method and always removed item 1 to 3. Surprisingly, the destruction of 
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these two features did not move the equilibrium to competitive outcome, and perfect tacit 
collusion returned in all experiments.  
[Table X] 
Table X reports the price, bid, and duration of the auctions with items removed 
for sale. Removing the items for sale had greater (incremental) effect in pushing the 
subjects away from collusive equilibrium than the previous treatments. In Experiment 5, 
the average price jumped to 680 francs immediate after the first three items were blocked 
for sale. Furthermore, prices stayed in high level for another two rounds and even 
attained an average price of 743 in round 15, which exhibited one of the most competitive 
scenarios in the experiment: 117 bids had been entered and the auction lasted for 682 
seconds, the third-longest round in the entire experiment series.  
Although removing the items for sale had more impacts than the previous 
treatments, its effects remain modest and diminish over time. In Experiment 3, perfect 
collusion persisted even when 5 items were blocked in some rounds. In Experiments 4 
and 6, although the prices rose somewhat after the items were blocked, their levels were 
low and the auctions were still filled with collusive behavior. Even in Experiment 5, 
where removal of items lead to the most competitive behaviors among the experiments, 
the prices converged to the perfect collusive level after six rounds.  
 
Result 9: Destruction of common expectations by surprise competitive entry a): 
Leads to competitive biddings on the item with entry b): Spreads the competitive 
behavior to items with single high-valued bidder, and c): Causes price wars in 
future rounds of auctions with symmetry. 
Support: In the collusive equilibrium, a subject with a valuation above 800 on an item 
wins it at the reservation price. Once collusion has persisted for more than 10 periods, it 
is natural for the subjects to expect that this will continue to happen. To destroy this 
common expectation, we typically switched the valuations of some subjects so that there 
were multiple bidders with valuations above 800 on some items. Take Figure I as an 
example, where subject 103’s original valuation is 782 on item 5 and 808 on item 7. We 
switch his valuations on these two items (of course without 103’s knowledge), so subject 
103’s new valuations become 808 on item 5 and 782 on item 7. This change destroys the 
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symmetry of valuation by adding a surprise entry: there are now two bidders, 103 and 
104, both having valuations above 800 on item 5. It also destroyed the “item aligned” 
property of the preference: 103 no longer had the highest valuation on the item 5, the 
item he valued most.  In each experiment, this surprise entry took place in two 
consecutive rounds. After these two rounds, we removed this treatment so that each item 
had again only one subject with valuation above 800.  
[Table XI] 
Table XI reports the details of the change and the winning prices of all items for 
sale. Three patterns emerge out of destruction of common expectation. First, the prices of 
items with multiple high-valued subjects rose to very high levels except in round 17 of 
experiment 4 and in round 12 of experiment 6. Furthermore, the prices on some items 
were even above the competitive levels. For example, in round 13 of experiment 6, item 
4, 5 and 6 were sold at 834, 863, and 862 respectively, which were significantly higher 
than 746, 834, and 808, the second-highest valuations on these items. This is an 
indication that subjects had used spiteful behavior either as pure retaliation or as an urge 
for return to collusive equilibrium.  
Second, there is a contagion of price war from initially contested items to items 
with single high-valued subject. In round 13 of experiment 6, only item 5 and 6 had more 
than one subject with valuations above 800. Consequently, the only initial bid wars were 
between 101 and 102 on item 6 and between 106 and 107 on item 5. The price of item 4 
remained at 104 francs even when the prices of item 5 and 6 had both risen above 800. 
Subject 101, who was potentially frustrated by his loss in the price war on item 6, soon 
started to bid on item 4. The price of item 4 rose quickly, and 101’s final bid on it was 
800, more than 100 above his valuation. Similar patterns of bidding wars existed in other 
experiments as well.  
Third, once the common expectation is broken, price wars appear in later rounds 
where all items have a single subject with valuation above 800 francs. Some of the 
bidding wars seemed to result from frustrations and angers in the previous round. For 
example, subject 104 didn’t win any item in round 13 of Experiment 4, even though his 
valuation on item 2 was above 800. In round 14, 104 started out by bidding 749 on item 1 
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and 769 on item 3, even though his valuations for these two items are only 249 and 190 
francs respectively. 
The spiteful behaviors gradually die out and prices fall down to collusive levels in 
most experiments after more rounds of auction once the treatment was removed. 
However, the convergence toward collusive equilibrium is more difficult after 
expectations have been destroyed. In Experiment 3, for example, the prices never fell to 
the perfect collusive level after common expectations were destroyed.  There were two 
items sold at above 500 francs five rounds after the treatment was removed. Furthermore, 
even if the prices approached the collusive level, the collusive equilibrium did not seem 
to be very robust. This can be seen from the “last round” behaviors of the subjects. 
 
Result 10:  Destruction of the repeated nature of the game creates competition if 
there are fewer items than bidders and common expectations were destroyed before. 
Support:  In Experiments 1 and 4, the experimenter announced before the last round that 
“the next round will be the last round of the experiment”. Two dramatically different 
behaviors were observed. In Experiment 1, the experimenter announced that Round 11 
was the last round. The subjects responded very little to this announcement. The prices 
remained low, as the highest price of the items is only 120 and the average price is 
103.75. This was very close to the perfect tacit collusion. 
In Experiment 4, however, the subjects responded dramatically to the 
announcement that round 23 was the last round. Before that, the outcome of round 22 
was rather collusive: the highest price is only 200 and the average price was 143. In 
round 23, subjects bid aggressively on all of the five items. The average price was 
694.75, and there were three items priced above 700. Furthermore, item 3 was sold at 
824, 25 francs higher than the second highest-valuation on this item.8  
There are two possible reasons for the competitive bidding behaviors. First, there 
were only five items for sale in this round. Therefore, perfect collusion cannot be 
supported as a N.E. if the subjects follow undominated strategies. Second, it could be that 
collusive equilibrium is less stable after the common expectations have been destroyed.  
 
                                                 
8 However, there is no spiteful behavior here, as the high price results from a jump bid of the winner. 
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7.  SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The fundamental results reflect the discovery of an environment in which tacit collusion 
evolves naturally without conspiracy and without intervention or encouragement by the 
experimenter and without any special facilitating device.  The allocation, including 
prices, is predicted accurately by a specific solution to a game theoretic model of the 
auction process. In this environment, the folding pattern of preferences are known and 
opportunity of coordination into mutually beneficial patterns of behavior can be easily 
identified.  In addition, the institutional environment supplies opportunities for retaliation 
for unwanted competitive behavior.  In this environment, perfectly collusive strategies 
develop quickly. 
The dynamics of adjustment in this environment exhibit distinct patterns.  In some 
cases, the tacit collusion is immediate. That is, from the structure of the environment 
alone agents deduce and implement a commonly held strategy of tacit collusion.  In these 
cases there is no learning, retaliations, or adjustments.  The advantages of tacit collusion 
result from cognition alone and are implemented.  In the cases in which the tacit collusion 
does not occur immediately, the system typically starts with the competitive equilibrium 
outcome. As the rounds proceed, prices decline gradually, until there is one round that 
appears as a "regime shift" and perfect tacit collusion is reached immediately afterwards.  
Several experiments were conducted using the “exploratory methodology” and 
using the opportunity of an existing tacit collusion to explore the many dimensions that 
can be imagined as “remedies”.  Rather than choose one “remedy” and collect many 
observations on it, many remedies were explored and done so in sequence.  Thus, we 
have produced a preliminary “map” of a varied and complex landscape of institutions 
together with strong hints about where different remedies might lead.  It is hoped that this 
map will guide researchers using more surgically precise experimental designs through 
this complex terrain.  Our summary that follows should be read from that perspective. 
Once collusion has developed it is difficult to disrupt and appears to be held in 
place by a pure system of belief as opposed to institutions and information that enable the 
maintenance of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.  The sequential removal of informational 
and institutional features that are prominent in the creation of equilibria in the models 
consistent with the collusive pattern of behaviors do nothing to change the behavior. 
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Tacit collusion remains, or if disrupted by the environmental change, returns as the 
prominent pattern of behavior.  
The treatment or "remedy" that effectively eliminates the collusion is a change 
that creates competition in one or two of the markets.  If an agent finds himself or herself 
with a competition for his/her item the competition spreads to other markets. In a sense, 
the unexpected introduction of a "maverick" under circumstances in which almost all of 
the features of the collusive compatible environment have been removed destroys the 
collusive behavior. The dramatic change in behavior could be the result of destroyed 
beliefs about the behavior of others coupled with an inability to determine otherwise due 
to the institutional environment.  This change nudges competition from the contested 
market to other markets.  An understanding of this process of contagion is needed.    
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1.  
Lemma 1: Let m be the minimal bid increment.  Assume that for every item k, we 
have , where is the highest valuation on item k and is its second 
highest valuation. If bidder i does not win any item in a subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome, the final price on i’s item must be larger than equal to . 
22 k km V V< − kV 2kV
iV m−
 
Proof: Suppose the contrary. Then bidder i’s profit is zero, and the price on his item, ip , is 
larger than or equal to . Now suppose i bids iV m− { ,i i }Max V m p m− +  on item i and bids  
jV m ε− −  on items such that 2j jV m p− >  for j i≠ , where 
, 2
{ 2 ,
j j
j jj i V m p
}Min V m p mε
≠ − >
= − − . In this way, the price of each item is larger than its 
highest valuation minus twice of the minimal bid increment, which is larger than the 
second highest valuation.  Therefore, any Nash Equilibrium of this subgame must have 
that no bidder will want to bid on item that he doesn’t have the highest valuation and that 
each bidder j whose item has been bid by i will bid on his own item.  Therefore, bidder I 
can guarantee himself positive payoff in this subgame, which is a contradiction.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
First, the discussion above indicates that every bidder winning his item at the reservation 
price can be supported as a S.P.E.  This implies that for a subject, call it subject A, to 
acquire a higher level of profit than in perfect collusion, he must obtain positive profits 
from at least two items. This implies that A wins at least two items. Now we partition the 
set of items into W and L, where W includes all of items whose highest-valued bidder is a 
winner (wins at least one item) and L includes items whose highest-valued bidder does 
not win any item.  Since A wins at least two items, at least one bidder is itemless, so L is 
not empty. Now by lemma 1, the prices of items in L must be higher than the second 
highest valuations on these items. This implies that the winners of these items in L must 
suffer losses from them. Because A has positive profits from at least two items in W, one 
winner must win zero item from W. The only items this winner wins must come from L 
and thus his total profit from the auction is negative. This leads to a contradiction because 
in equilibrium any bidder can at least guarantee himself nonnegative profits.  Q.E.D. 
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 Subject\Item Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 
101 833 212 706 101 290 180 317 94 
102 787 164 893 69 325 223 266 146 
103 327 121 284 214 782 76 808 187 
104 252 55 303 158 856 105 738 241 
105 238 844 194 343 81 745 106 277 
106 159 788 218 276 122 841 75 340 
107 143 303 52 848 157 280 235 796 
108 81 266 116 795 215 342 181 827 
Figure I: A Sample Valuation Sheet 
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Figure II. Competitiveness of the Market 
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Figure III shows the average price series for the six experiments. 
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Figure III. Average Prices until Perfect Collusion 
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Figure IV. Number of Bids until Perfect Collusion 
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Figure V. Duration of the Auctions until Perfect Collusion. 
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Table I: Summary of Experimental Environment 
 
Experiments E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 
Date 02/18/02 04/19/02 05/10/02 06/12/02 06/21/02 06/29/02 
Total 
Rounds 
11 14 18 23 26 17 
Blank ID 9-11 N/A 6-18 8-23 7-26 4-6 
Remove 
Valuations 
N/A 9-14 3-18 12-23 10-26 7-8 
Change 
End-Rules 
N/A 11-12 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Remove 
Items 
N/A N/A 4-18 14-23 13-26 9-17 
Destroy 
Expectations 
N/A N/A 12-13 17-18 22-23 12-13 
Announce 
Final Round 
Yes No No Yes No No 
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Table II. Price, Bids, and Duration on Number of Rounds Played* 
  
Dependent Variables        Constant         Rounds         R^2         Number of Observations  
 
 
Prices                               534.14               -71.33        0.23                      30    
                    (70.48)               (12.86)   
LogPrices                          6.39                   -.28            0.24                      30  
                    (0.26)                 (.05) 
Bids                                   81.42                  -11.15       0.19                      30   
                    (15.80)              (3.40)     
LogBids                             4.35                    -.41           0.07                      30  
                                          (.48)                   (.07) 
Duration                            456.29                -54.37        0.12                     30  
                                          (111.93)             (24.5) 
LogDuration                      6.07                    -.39            0.07                     30   
                               (.56)                   (.11) 
 
 
• Estimated from Random Effects Model. 
41  
Table III: Summary Statistics for Colluders 
   Experiment        
   /Round            101        102         103         104         105         106        107         108 
 
         2/18/02 
   Round 1            0*          1             1             1             0             0            0             0 
   Round 2            0            1             1             1             0             0            0             0 
   Round 3            0            0             1             1             0             0            0             0 
   Round 4            1            0             1             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 5            0            0             1             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 6            0            0             0             0             0             0            1             0 
   Round 7            0            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
 
     4/19/02 
   Round 1            0            0             1             1             1             1            1             0 
   Round 2            0            1             1             0             1             1            0             1 
   Round 3            1            0             1             0             1             0            0             1 
   Round 4            0            0             1             0             1             0            0             0 
   Round 5            0            0             1             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 6            0            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
 
     5/10/02 
   Round 1            0            0             0             0             0             0            1             0 
   Round 2            0            0             1             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 3            0            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
 
     6/12/02 
   Round 1            1            1             0             0             0             1            1             0 
   Round 2            1            0             0             0             0             1            0             0 
   Round 3            1            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 4            1            1             0             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 5            0            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
 
    6/21/02 
   Round 1            0            1             0             1             0             1            1             0 
   Round 2            0            0             0             1             0             1            1             0 
   Round 3            0            0             0             1             0             1            0             0 
   Round 4            0            0             0             1             0             1            0             0 
   Round 5            0            0             0             1             0             1            0             0 
   Round 6            0            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
 
    6/29/02 
   Round 1            1            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
   Round 2            0            0             0             0             0             0            0             0 
 
*: In the table, a bidder is marked as a 0 if he is classified as a colluder and 1 otherwise. 
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Table IV: Number of Bids and Average Prices at and after the Regime Shift 
 
Experiment Round Number of Bids Average Prices 
2/18/02 2 101 558 
 3   34 310 
4/19/02 5   86 368 
 6     8 100 
6/12/02 1 108 427 
 2   33 210 
6/21/02 1 128 651 
 2   28 269 
 
 
      Table V: Valuation of 103 and 107 on Item 1 and 3 
Subject\Items 1 3 
103 867 773 
107 771 861 
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Table VI: A Bidding War 
time item id price
3055 3 107 100
3069 1 103 200
3077 3 103 200
3099 3 107 210
3120 3 103 220
3132 3 107 230
3144 3 103 300
3160 3 107 310
3173 3 103 400
3178 1 107 300
3185 3 107 410
3199 1 103 310
3211 1 107 350
3226 1 103 360
3237 1 107 400
3247 1 103 450
3257 1 107 500
3264 3 103 500
3276 1 107 510
3282 3 107 510
3291 1 103 520
3302 3 103 520
time item id price
3309 3 107 530
3326 3 103 550
3334 3 107 560
3341 1 107 550
3344 3 103 600
3356 3 107 610
3367 1 103 600
3376 3 103 650
3387 1 107 650
3392 3 107 700
3417 1 103 761
3429 3 103 710
3436 1 107 771
3445 3 107 720
3453 1 103 781
3472 3 103 730
3482 3 107 740
3507 3 103 752
3523 3 107 773
3529 1 107 791
3546 1 103 801
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Table VII: Summary Statistics after IDs are Blanked 
        
   Experiment         Highest         Lowest         Average          Duration          Total      
   /Round                   Price            Price             Price               Time               Bids  
    
        2/18/02 
   Round 9                  100               100               100                  22                   8 
   Round 10                200               100               113.5               29                   8 
   Round 11                100               100               100                  14                   8 
 
       5/10/02 
   Round 6                  100               100               100                  14                   5 
   Round 7                  100               100               100                  15                   5 
 
       6/12/02 
   Round 8                  121               100               108                 115                17 
   Round 9                  150               100               106.25             35                  9 
   Round 10                255               100               135.13            134                16 
   Round 11                100               100               100                  16                  8 
 
       6/21/02 
   Round 7                  160               120               151.25             214               45 
   Round 8                  160               100               107.5                15                 8 
   Round 9                  110               100               101.25              37                 9 
 
       6/29/02 
   Round 4                  100               100               100                   19                 8 
   Round 5                  120               100               102.63              44                 9 
   Round 6                  101               100               101.13              18                 8 
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Table VIII: Summary Statistics after Valuations Sheets are Taken Away 
 
   Experiment         Highest         Lowest         Average          Duration          Total      
   /Round                   Price            Price             Price               Time               Bids  
    
       4/19/02 
   Round 9                  807               100               263.25            165                  20 
   Round 10                100               100               100                  21                    8 
 
       5/10/02 
   Round 3                  100               100               100                  20                    8 
    
       6/12/02 
   Round 12                170               151               160.88             228                 37 
   Round 13                100               100               100                   17                   8 
 
       6/21/02 
   Round 10                310               100               127.5                40                  10 
   Round 11                110               100               101.25              23                   8 
   Round 12                120               100               102.5                19                   8 
 
       6/29/02 
   Round 7                  104               100               100.5                18                   8 
   Round 8                  104               100               100.63              19                   8 
 
 
 
 
Table IX: Summary Statistics for the Fixed Duration Rule 
        
   Experiment    Item 1     Item2     Item3     Item4     Item5     Item6     Item7     Item8     
   /Round           Price        Price      Price      Price      Price      Price      Price      Price 
                       (Winner)(Winner)(Winner)(Winner)(Winner)(Winner)(Winner)(Winner) 
    
    4/19/02 
   Round 11        100          150        100        100         100         100        100        100 
                          (108)       (107)     (104)      (106)      (105)       (107)     (101)     (103) 
    
   Round 12        100          100        100        100         N/A        100         100        120 
                          (107)       (104)     (108)      (105)       N/A       (102)      (103)     (107)  
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Table X: Summary Statistics after Some Items are Removed for Sale 
        
   Experiment      Highest       Lowest       Average        Duration        Total        Items    
   /Round                Price          Price           Price             Time             Bids       Blocked 
    
      5/10/02 
   Round 4              100              100             100                14                 5              1,4,5 
   Round 5              100              100             100                14                 5              3,4,7  
   Round 6              100              100             100                14                 5              2,5,8 
   Round 7              100              100             100                15                 5              2,3,6 
   Round 8              100              100             100                 6                  3            2,3,4,6,7 
   Round 9              120              100             110                48                 6            2,3,4,5,8 
   Round 10            100              100             100                 6                  3            1,2,6,7,8 
   Round 11            100              100             100                 3                  3            4,5,6,7,8 
    
          6/12/02 
   Round 14            280              160             196                233               37           1,2,3 
   Round 15            180              140             160                202               27           1,2,3 
   Round 16            122              100             104.38            30                 7            1,2,3 
    
          6/21/02 
   Round 13            710               660             682               391               68           1,2,3 
   Round 14            780               410             596               174               38           1,2,3 
   Round 15            800               710             743               682              117          1,2,3 
   Round 16            130               100             110                38                 9            1,2,3 
   Round 17            610               310             428               480               51           1,2,3 
   Round 18            610               100             229               149               27           1,2,3 
   Round 19            110               100             102                20                 6            1,2,3 
   Round 20            120               100             104                43                 7            1,2,3 
   Round 21            120               100             106                36                 7            1,2,3 
 
      6/29/02 
   Round 9              110               100            103.38           23                 6             1,2,3 
   Round 10            155               100            113.25            47                 9            1,2,3 
   Round 11            107               100            101.38             9                  5            1,2,3   
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Table XI: Price Statistics after Common Expectation Destruction 
 
Experiment/Round Chosen/Items Item 
1 
Price 
Item 
2 
Price 
Item 
3 
Price 
Item 
4 
Price 
Item 
5 
Price 
Item 
6 
Price 
Item 
7 
Price 
5/10/02         
Round 12 1,2 870 873 730     
Round 13 1,2 843 840 669     
6/12/02         
Round 17 6,8   410 530 460 420 460 
Round 18 6,8   860 770 876 751 631 
6/21/02         
Round 22 5,*   750 877 760 440 430 
Round 23 5,6   600 580 843 711 800 
6/29/02         
Round 12 5,6   100 200 302 100 100 
Round 13 5,6   834 863 862 100 100 
 
*There is an unintended switching, so 101, 104, and 107 all had high values in item 5. 
 
On 5/10/02, in round 12, 101’s valuation on item 2 and 5 was switched. 106’s valuation on item 1 and item 
8 was switched. 
In round 13, 102’s valuation on item 2 and 6 was switched; 105’s valuation on item 1 and 3 was switched. 
 
On 6/11/02, in round 17, 102’s valuation on item 6 was switched to 822; 104’s valuation on item 8 was 
switched to 821. 
In round 18, 102’s valuation on item 3 and item 6 was switched; 108’s valuation on item 8 and item 4 was 
switched.  
 
On 6/21/02, in round 22, 104’s valuation on item 2 and item 5 was switched; 107’s valuation on item 1 and 
item 5 was switched. 
In round 23, 101’s valuation on item 2 and item 6 was switched; 106’s valuation on item 1 and item 5 was 
switched. 
 
On 6/29/02, in round 12, 104’s valuation on item 2 and 6 was switched; 107’s valuation on item 1 and 5 
was switched. 
In round 13, 101’s valuation on item 2 and 6 was switched; 106’s valuation on item 1 and 5 was switched. 
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